The paper presents the rationale for a functional simulation tool, called DEPEND,
Once a prototype system exists , actual fault-injection can be performed to determine whether it meets its dependability specifications.
There has been substantial research and development of analytical tools used during the first stages of a design.
In [12] , the authors describe and compare several tools that solve CTMC models. There is increasing work in software and hardware fault injection of prototype systems [1, 3, 18, 27, 28, 40, 45, 47] . The focus of this paper is on the second stage, and in particular on the use of functional simulation-based tools for system level dependability analysis. andinterrupt the system, andan element that determines the response to a fault (the fault model), the two criteriaaremet. The first object1is commonto all fault injectionmethods.It encapsulates the variousmechanisms usedto determinethe arrival time of a fault andinterrupt the system.The secondobject is the fault modeland is specificto the component being injectedand the type of fault injection study. The two arecombinedvia functioncalls. Thus by specifyingdifferent fault modelobjects,oneinjector objectcanbe usedfor all typesof fault injections.Key objectssuchas the injector object, are designed to be parameterized. That is, the usercan specifyvariousfault arrival distributionsor tracefiles. This sameapproach is usedto model components that aresimilar but not identical;commonaspectsareencapsulated in an object whichthen invokesother objects to providemorespecificfunctionality. Furthermore,because userscan specifyspecificbehaviors (e.g. their ownfault modelobjects)the tool is not limited to any pre-defined set of fault models or component types.
A library of objectsthat providethe skeletalfoundationnecessary to model an architecture andconductsimulatedfault-injectionexperiments is providedto reducethe development time and effort neededto build simulationmodels.In additionto decomposition, compositionandparameterization, the conceptof inheritance[33]makesit possibleto providea library with a minimum setof objectsthat canbe readilyspecialized to modela widegamutof differentarchitecturesand fault injectionexperiments. With inheritance, userscaninherit the propertiesof anexistingobject and developmorespecialized objectswith minimumeffort.
The accelerationtechniquesto speed-upsimulationare presentedin the next sectionwhich describesthe DEPEND environmentin detail. The object-orientedparadigmalsofacilitatesthe implementationand automationof the acceleration techniques. specifications and a report containing the essential statistics of the simulation is produced. _In object-oriented programming, the 'elements' axe classes. An object is an instance of a class, but here, for simplicity, they will be referred to simply as objects. 
Fault injector
The fault injector is a fundamental object of DEPEND. It encapsulates the mechanism for injecting faults. To use the injector, a user specifies the number of components, the time to fault distribution for each component, and the fault subroutine which specifies the fault model. The distributions supported are constant time (mostly used for debugging), exponential, hyperexponential and Weibull. The object also allows user specified distributions.
When initialized, the injector samples from a random number generator to determine the earliest time to fault, sleeps until that time and calls the fault subroutine.
Initially, the injector usedconditionalfailuredistributionsto determinethe time to next fault, assuminga set of components haveindependent, identicallydistributed failure distributions. For instance,for a systemwith two components usinga gracefullydegradingsparingpolicy, the time to failure of the secondcomponent, X, given that the first component failed at time t is given by Pr[X < xmX > t]. For a Weibull time to fault distribution with rate parameter A and shape parameter c_, the conditional distribution is: DEPEND providesa workloaddependent injectionfacility to model the workload/failuredependencyobserved in [24, 4] . It canbe usedto test systems understressconditions•To implement a workloaddependent injectionstrategy,a statisticalclusteringalgorithm is first usedto identify high-densityregionsof the workload.Theseregions(or states)areusedto specifya statetransition diagramthat characterizes the workload [20] •Associatedwith eachstateis a visit counterwhich countsthe numberof visits to that state and a fault rate, )_, which the system experiences in that state• The user provides a workload function which the injector polls periodically to identify the workload state and to update its visit counter. For example, the workload function may be the utilization of a processor or it may be any other function that provides a measure between 0 (low workload) and 1 (high workload)• Based on an injection_interval specified by the user, the information from the state transition diagram is used to estimate a weighted average failure arrival rate (Wgt_lambda) as follows:
where:
N is the number of states
counter for statej visit_ratio, = total visits to all states
Once Wgt_lambda is determined, it is used to compute the probability of a failure injection (P_inject(t)) over the last interval t (= injection_intervaO as follows:
The fault injector illustrates what we mean by "providing a simulation framework"• The injector provides the basic algorithms and mechanisms needed to inject faults allowing the user to concentrate on the application specific aspects, the fault model and the simulation of a fault. Furthermore, the modular, object-oriented approach allows the user to easily experiment with different time to fault distributions, fault models and workload functions• Other DEPEND objects axe similarly designed to provide the functionality that are commonly needed without restricting the applicability of the object.
Simulation Time Acceleration
A drawback with simulation is that it can be execution time bound. DEPEND provides three ways to reduce simulation time explosion.
The main technique is the use of hierarchical simulation. The foundation of the approach is based on the notion of variable aggregation and decomposability [9] .
With this technique, a large complex model is broken down into simpler submodels. Another technique, providedby DEPENDto speed-upsimulationruns, is a generaltime accelerationmechanismwhich allowsthe simulationto leap forwardin time (figure3). DEPEND objectsfurnishthe time of the next important event,suchas the time whenthe next fault will arrive, or whenthe next latent fault will beactivated.A list of theseeventsthat affectdependability measures are kept in a chronologically sortedlist. The simulatorleapsforwardto the time of the eventat the headof the list and resumes processing at the granularityof the systemclock until the effectof the eventhassubsided. This is differentfrom regularevent-driven simulationbecause it allowsuser-specified "unimportant" eventsto be suspended during leapswhile otherscontinue. This acceleration techniqueis usedwith the Tandemsimulationdescribed in section6.2.
Finally,DEPEND'sC++, process-based environment facilitatesthe implementationof variance reductiontechniques [30] . Unlikeothersimulationtools, it providesdirectcontrolof the simulation engineso that importancesamplingtechniques can be efficientlyimplemented.See [35] on the difficultiesofimplementingsuchschemes if suchcontrolis not provided.Wechose not to incorporate anyparticular importancesamplingtechnique in DEPENDbecause their useandthe measures they canprovideareapplicationdependent.
Benefits of DEPEND
This section illustrates the uses of DEPEND and the need for its integrated design and fault injection environment during the second stage of the design process.
Behavioral Modeling
Analytical and Petri-net tools use stochastic models to represent the behavior of a system. In essence, the effect of a fault on the system is pre-defined by a set of probabilities and distributions. DEPEND uses stochastic modeling, but it also permits behavioral modeling which does not require that the effect of the faults be pre-defined.
An example that demonstrates this capability of DE-PEND is a study in which a distributed system using a centralized, prediction-based load balancing scheme is evaluated under faults [14, 13] (see figure 4) . If a purely probabilistic modeling tool were used for this study, the user would have to prespecify:
• the probability that a fault will corrupt the database,
• how each fault will corrupt the database, and
• which portions of the database will be corrupted and would have to quantify:
• the extent of corruption and
• how each corruption will impair the placement decision made by the load-balancing software.
Needless to say, these factors are extremely difficult to obtain without a thorough prior fault injection study. Because DEPEND executes the actual software, these parameters are the results of (and not inputs to) the fault-injection experiment.
Only the fault arrival rates and the types of faults injected need to be specified. Thus, DEPEND can identify the failure mechanisms, obtain failure probabilities, and quantize the effect of faults. It can be used to pick out the key features that must be modeled and help to determine and specify both the structure of, and the parameters to analytical models.
A single distinguishing feature between probabilistic modeling and behaviorM modeling is brought out by one of the results of this study (details of all the results can be found in [13] ).
The study helped to uncover a design feature of the software that caused erratic increases in system response time only when status messages were destroyed. Once the software was modified, the erratic increase in response time ceased. Not only are such studies beyond the range of analytical
• tools, to the authors' knowledge, this experiment would be difficult to conduct with many current software fault injection tools. in a system for long periods of time and are a potential hazard [6] . A measurement study of a VAX 11/780 [5] has shown the mean latency of an error can be in the order of minutes (tt = 44rain., a = 29rain.) during peak hours and to several hours (11 = 8hrs., _ = 4hrs.) during off-times.
Modeling latent errors is difficult with Markov models for several reasons. example, in a self-repairing system like the Tandem TMR-based prototype (detailed description can be found in section 6.1), the healthy processors reconfigure or repair a failed processor. If latent errors are detected in the healthy processors during a repair, the system fails. Modeling this inter-component dependence typically requires that the entire CTMC, its failure and repair process, be evaluated together, thus potentially leading to large, stiff models. In [10] , the authors present a novel decomposition technique to avoid such large, stiff models. With their approach, the repair coverage is evaluated in isolation and then 'adjusted' to account for the probability of a second, independent error in another component. The example below extends this analysis to also evaluate the impact of near-coincident errors due to latent errors in a repairing CPU. This example also models the inherent dependencies that exist among the system components. Fault injection experiments on the Tandem TMR-based prototype have shown that latent errors in the repairing processor are detected with high probability during repair and reconfiguration because much of the system is exercised during a repair. Figure 6 is a flowchart of the repair process that models this phenomenon.
It is invoked each time a latent error is activated.
Note that the repair process models near-coincident errors caused by a second, independent error in another processor (box 1 re-integration policies and workload dependent repair times. To study these issues, DEPEND was used to simulate the TMR-based system and evaluate the combined effect of all these factors. The salient features of the target system are described below, followed by subsections that describe the simulation model.
The Tandem TMR-based Prototype Fault-Tolerant System
The Tandem TMR-based fault-tolerant system [25] is shown in figure 8 . In the prototype, each CPU was a MIPS R3000 RISC processor with an on-chip virtual memory mechanism and a separate 
The Simulation Model Developed with DEPEND
Recallthat we areinterestedin evaluatingthe TandemTMR-basedprototypesystemandseveral of its architecturalfeaturesunderthe stressof near-coincident errors. To achievethis, several key characteristics of the Tandemsystemweresimulated.Theseinclude:
• the loosesynchronization policy of the system(the fact that the processors idle at the voters to synchronize, andthe exacttime needed by the voting operation),
• the CPU (with its local memory) and the global memory structure that is unique to the Tandem system,
• the functional behavior of the error-detection mechanisms of the CPU and global memory structure,
• the CPU off-line POST and the on-line re-integration process and the global memory background re-integration process that are unique to the Tandem system, and
• the behavior of the Tandem system when a CPU and global memory re-integration occurs simultaneously (prioritized re-integration).
These details of the system architecture and how it reacts to faults were determined by studying its layouts, descriptions and manuals, discussing the matter with its designers and conducting several fault injection studies (in addition to the validation experiments mentioned below). Simultaneous injections into various components of the system helped to uncover interesting characteristics of the system that were subsequently incorporated into the simulation model.
The simulation model for the Tandem system, developed with DEPEND, is shown in figure 9 .
The blocks on the right are the DEPEND objects used in the simulation model. The block on the left summarizes the program written to create the simulation model and control the operations of each of the components.
The NMR object in the DEPEND library is the primary object used in the simulation.
The NMR object simulates dual self-checking, triple-modular redundant and N-modular redundant systems. The servers idle until they receive a task to process. They then execute for a specified time period and feed their results to the voter. The voter waits for all the servers and then executes a voting algorithm.
A timeout condition is used to prevent hanging in cases where a server fails to report to the voter. The NMR object provides two voting algorithms:
bit The processing core of the TMR-based system is simulated with a NMR object containing 3 servers. Each server simulates a processor board containing a CPU and a local memory. The NMR's injector is used to inject errors into both the processor and the local memory.
The two global memory boards are simulated with a NMR with 2 servers. Every 2047 cycles, when the processors synchronize, the global memory's error-based voting function is explicitly invoked by the control program to check each server and shut down any that has an active error. This simulates the actual operation of the system because parity errors in the global memory are detected when the processors synchronize at the voter to access global memory.
The control program in figure 9 is the only part that is written by the user. It declares instances of the two DEPEND objects and initializes and customizes them. Initialization consists of specifying the error arrival distribution, the error arrival rate, the error latency distribution and so on. Then each object is "started" causing them to automatically perform tasks based on the parameters specified. All actions are automatically logged and the user can call functions to obtain a detailed report of every fault or repair. In addition, statistics such as availability, MTBF, the number of faults injected, the mean time between repair and the repair coverage are available.
The controlprogramsimulates the executionof 2047instructionsandthe votingprocess. If any detectableerrorsarefoundin anyof the components duringvoting,the components areshutdown. The statusof the systemis checked to determinewhetherit hasfailed(i.e. two CPUsor both global memoryboardshavefailed). If the systemhasfailed,it is rebootedandthe simulationrestarts. If the systemhas not failed, a backgroundre-integrationprocessis started for any component that wasshutdownearlierby the voter. Finally, the control programchecksto seeif re-integrations initiated in an earliercyclehascompleted.If so,they are handledbasedon the componenttype (CPU or globalmemory)as describedin the previoussection.Thoughnot shownin figure9, the memoryscrubbingprocess is alsosimulated.Although the simulationcan producemany results, the oneweare mostconcerned with is the meantime betweensystemfailures(MTBF). The complete error occurrence process for just two CPUs is illustrated in figure 10 . A similar process is used to inject errors into the global memory with one exception; only latent errors are injected. The error arrival times are exponentially distributed. When an error is injected, a probabilistic branch is used to determine whether it is a correlated error affecting 2 or more components in a subsystem, or a single error. A probabilistic branch is also used to determine whether the error is active or latent.
The Error
Eventually, the error is detected by the voter and the component is shutdown and then re-integrated. of global memory per board) and the contribution of the CPU error arrival rate to the combined error arrival rate.
The voter is assumed to be error free. To compensate for the fact that the measurements are from a larger system, three combined error arrival rates (shown in table 4) are usedin the simulations.Still, onecannotassertthat the errorrate of the target systemis similar to that of the VAX cluster,but sincethe focusof this study is on relativetrends and changes to systemreliability andnot absoluteMTBF figures,this doesnot posea problem.
The error latenciesusedin this study areapproximated by normaldistributionswith the means and standarddeviationsfrom the measurement study in [5] . A larger latencywith a meanof 36 hoursand a standarddeviationof 18 hoursis alsousedin the simulationsto determinethe effect of extremelylargelatencies.
All errors,includingundetected latent errors,residingin a processor or in a globalmemoryare assumed to becorrectedwhenthe component undergoes a re-integration, the systemis rebooted, or whenscrubbingtakesplace.Thus,not all theerrorsinjectedaredetected andthe actualerrorarrival distribution of detected errors depends on the scrubbing rate, the component re-integration rate, the error latency and the injection rate. Because error latencies and global memory re-integration times are workload dependent, various system workloads are implicitly modeled by varying these parameters. Finally, since we are primarily concerned with transient errors, permanent errors are not injected and the MTBFs presented do not reflect their impact on system reliability. Figure 11 shows the hybrid monitoring environment used to conduct the experiments. A detailed description of the environment can be found in [47, 16] , and a description of all the experiments conducted can be found in [16] . The hybrid environment takes advantage of the target system's ability to re-integrate a failed component of a subsystem on-the-fly. The environment is automated and can execute for days repeatedly injecting errors and collecting measurements. A Tektronix DAS 9200 digital logic analyzer is used to monitor the bus activity on the CPU that is injected with errors. A finite state machine is used to specify the data that is collected, such as the times when an injection occurs, an exception is raised, and when POST is initiated.
A DAS control program running on a Sun workstation accepts start, stop and data upload commands from the injection program, translates them, and relays them to the DAS. The injection program runs on the Tandem TRM prototype machine and injects errors into the text region (the region containing the machine instructions) of a process. Injecting an error consists of randomly selecting a word, and randomly corrupting one bit of the word residing in the memory of CPUB. If the word resides in the cache, it is deleted to ensure that the corrupted version of the word is used.
The target applications are Gaussian elimination programs which repeatedly generate 300-by-300 element matrices and execute the Gaussian elimination algorithm to solve the set of simultaneous equations. Two instances of the program were executed simultaneously and injected with errors. Figure 12 shows the injection program used to collect the time to CPU shutdown distribution The figure also illustrates the degradation in reliability caused by increasing the global memory's re-integration times. A ten fold increase in the re-integration time (from 30 seconds to 5 minutes) reduced the MTBF by a factor of 5 for A2, and a factor of 7 for A1. As the error arrival rate decreases, the impact of the re-integration times will become less of a factor. However, since the re-integration time is dependent upon the size of the memory, the system reliability will decrease as memory size increases; the decrease will be more than linear because the larger memory will also increase the error arrival rate.
The performance overhead for voting was measured during the experiments and was found to be 3.36% with the assumptions that the processors only vote every 2047 cycles and that they all arrive at the voter at the same time. This is the minimum voting overhead because in actual operation, the CPUs are likely to vote more often (i.e., they vote whenever they access global memory or perform I/O) and they will typically never reach the voter at the same time, leaving the early comers to idle waiting for the slowest processor. figure 17 shows the increase in the number of failures for when the global memory re-integration time is increased to 2 minutes, reducing POST times has no effect on system MTBF. According to table 3, global memory re-integration time for a 32Mbyte system is 2 minutes when the system is working at half capacity. Clearly, given the assumption that 62% 3 of all errors are injected into the global memory, the "reliability bottleneck" is the large 3This number was determined based on the size of the global memory and the CPU local memories. See section 6.3.2. re-integrationtime of the global memory. Rather than trying to reduceCPU POST times, the designers shouldfocustheir effortson reducingglobalmemoryre-integrationtimes.
The resultsof simulationswherecorrelatederrors are injectedare shownin figure 18b. For thesesimulations,the globalmemory'sre-integrationtime waskept fixed at 30 seconds.Again, in this experimentweseethat the presence of correlatederrorsdiminishesany gainsachievedby reducingthe CPU POST times. Finally, evaluationof the impact of CPU andglobal memoryre-integrationtimes showedthat if the machineis working at half capacity,the global memoryre-integrationtime is the reliability bottleneck.Designers shouldtry to reducethis time rather than CPU re-integrationtimes.
An important but often overlooked issueis howaccuratelya modelrepresents the systemunder study. Resultsobtainedusingthe DEPENDsimulationmodelwerevalidatedby comparingthem with measurements obtainedfrom fault injectionexperimentsconductedon a prototype Tandem system.A hybrid monitoringtestbedwasusedto conductthe injectionexperiments. The resultsof the validationexperiments demonstrated that DEPENDis capableof capturingthe intricaciesof a real system.To our knowledge, no other simulation-based dependabilitystudy hasbeenvalidated in sucha fashion. 
